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Brentano	  on	  Consciousness	  Mark	  Textor	  	  	  	  Consider	  a	  perceptual	  activity	  such	  as	  seeing	  a	  colour,	  hearing	  a	  tone,	  tasting	  a	  flavour.	  How	  are	  these	  activities	  related	  to	  one’s	  awareness	  of	  them?	  I	  will	  use	  Brentano’s	  struggle	  with	  this	  question	  to	  guide	  the	  reader	  through	  the	  development	  of	  his	  view	  on	  consciousness.	  My	  starting	  point	  will	  be	  Brentano’s	  book	  Die	  Psychologie	  des	  Aristoteles	  (Brentano	  1867),	  in	  which	  he	  developed	  an	  inner	  sense	  view	  of	  consciousness	  (§§1-­‐2).	  Brentano’s	  early	  view	  is	  underexplored	  in	  the	  literature,	  but	  crucial	  for	  understanding	  the	  development	  of	  his	  thought	  on	  the	  matter.	  In	  his	  major	  work	  Psychologie	  vom	  Empirischen	  
Standpunkt	  (1874)	  he	  rejected	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  inner	  sense:	  the	  exercises	  of	  our	  five	  senses	  yield	  awareness	  of	  the	  world	  (or	  at	  least	  of	  intentional	  objects)	  as	  well	  as	  awareness	  of	  these	  perceptions.	  This	  same-­‐level	  view	  of	  consciousness	  has	  been	  explored	  and	  developed	  by	  contemporary	  philosophers	  of	  mind.	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  arguments	  that	  moved	  Brentano	  to	  change	  his	  mind,	  outline	  the	  view	  and,	  finally,	  respond	  to	  Husserl’s	  influential	  criticism	  of	  Brentano’s	  view	  (§§3-­‐5).	  	  
1.	  Brentano	  on	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation	  	  Let’s	  start	  with	  the	  question	  that	  Brentano	  (inspired	  by	  Aristotle)	  wanted	  to	  answer.	  Imagine,	  for	  instance,	  that	  you	  see	  a	  green	  leaf	  in	  good	  light.	  If	  the	  question	  is	  raised	  what	  colour	  the	  leaf	  is,	  your	  perception	  puts	  you	  in	  a	  position	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  knowledgeably.	  Furthermore,	  you	  do	  not	  need	  to	  do	  anything	  further	  to	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  answer	  the	  further	  question	  ‘How	  do	  you	  know	  this?’	  Seeing	  the	  green	  leaf	  provides	  perceptual	  knowledge	  of	  the	  colour	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  ongoing	  seeing	  itself.	  We	  would	  be	  astonished	  if	  someone	  –	  looking	  at	  a	  green	  leaf	  –	  said	  ‘The	  leaf	  is	  green,	  but	  now	  let	  me	  find	  out	  how	  I	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know	  this’.	  Locke	  aimed	  to	  capture	  this	  observation	  as	  follows:	  
[It	  is]	  impossible	  for	  any	  one	  to	  perceive,	  without	  perceiving,	  that	  he	  does	  perceive.	  When	  we	  see,	  hear,	  smell,	  taste,	  feel,	  meditate,	  or	  will	  anything,	  we	  know	  that	  we	  do	  so.	  (Locke	  1690,	  II,	  xxvii,	  9)	  If	  we	  take	  Locke	  by	  his	  word,	  he	  tried	  to	  articulate	  the	  observation	  about	  perception	  in	  terms	  of	  perceiving-­‐that:	  	  (PP1)	  Necessarily,	  if	  S	  perceives	  x,	  then	  S	  perceives	  that	  S	  perceives	  x.	  Now,	  one	  perceives	  that	  p	  if,	  and	  only	  if,	  one	  judges	  that	  p	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  one’s	  perceiving.	  For	  instance,	  to	  use	  one	  of	  Dretske’s	  examples,	  I	  can	  see	  that	  the	  tank	  is	  half-­‐empty	  without	  the	  tank	  itself	  looking	  some	  way	  to	  me:	  I	  just	  need	  to	  see	  the	  gasometer.	  All	  I	  need	  to	  do	  is	  to	  acquire	  the	  knowledge	  that	  the	  tank	  is	  half-­‐empty	  by	  seeing.	  Locke’s	  (PP1)	  is	  therefore	  a	  controversial	  philosophical	  thesis	  that	  goes	  beyond	  the	  observation	  we	  started	  from.	  Prima	  facie,	  one	  wants	  to	  credit	  some	  subjects	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  perceive	  something	  even	  though	  they	  are	  not	  able	  to	  judge	  that	  they	  themselves	  are	  perceiving.	  	  (PP2)	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  this	  difficulty:	  (PP2)	  Necessarily,	  if	  S	  perceives	  x,	  then	  S	  perceives	  S’s	  perceiving	  of	  x.	  However,	  what	  is	  it	  to	  perceive	  one’s	  perceiving?	  Consider	  your	  seeing	  a	  green	  leaf	  again.	  The	  colour	  looks	  a	  particular	  way	  to	  you,	  your	  seeing	  green	  doesn’t.	  Hence,	  if	  one	  perceives	  one’s	  seeing	  at	  all,	  it	  must	  be	  perceived	  by	  a	  different	  sense	  than	  sight.	  In	  his	  early	  work	  Die	  Psychologie	  des	  Aristoteles	  Brentano	  developed	  this	  argument	  in	  detail:	  
Because	  we	  sense	  (empfinden)	  that	  we	  see	  and	  hear,	  the	  question	  arises	  whether	  we	  perceive	  this	  [that	  we	  see	  and	  hear]	  with	  sight	  and	  hearing,	  or	  with	  another	  sense.	  If	  we	  perceive	  by	  means	  of	  sight	  itself	  that	  we	  see,	  we	  must	  see	  that	  we	  see,	  for	  the	  activity	  (Tätigkeit)	  of	  this	  sense	  is	  seeing,	  and	  the	  seeing	  as	  seeing	  should	  therefore	  belong	  either	  to	  the	  distinctive	  object	  of	  sight	  or	  to	  one	  of	  the	  common	  objects	  of	  sight.	  (Brentano	  1867:	  85-­‐6;	  my	  translation)	  Brentano	  talked	  here	  about	  perceiving	  that	  one	  sees.	  But	  the	  point	  under	  consideration	  does	  not	  arise	  for	  perceiving	  that	  one	  perceives.	  He	  was	  not	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sensitive	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  perceiving	  an	  object	  and	  perceiving-­‐that.	  But	  we	  can	  reformulate	  his	  thought	  in	  a	  charitable	  way	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	   Extra-­Sense	  Argument	  	   (P1)	  We	  perceive	  seeing	  when	  we	  see.	  (P2)	  Either	  we	  perceive	  seeing	  by	  sight	  or	  by	  another	  sense.	  	  (P3)	  The	  distinctive	  object	  of	  sight	  is	  colour;	  by	  means	  of	  sight	  one	  can	  also	  perceive	  shape	  and	  size	  together	  with	  colour.	  (P4)	  Seeing	  is	  not	  coloured,	  nor	  has	  it	  form	  or	  size	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  together	  with	  colour.	  (C1)	  Hence,	  we	  don’t	  perceive	  seeing	  by	  sight.	  (C2)	  Hence,	  we	  perceive	  seeing	  by	  another	  sense.	  	  	   (P5)	  Seeing	  it	  not	  a	  distinctive	  object	  of	  any	  of	  the	  other	  four	  senses.	  (C3)	  Therefore,	  we	  don’t	  perceive	  seeing	  by	  any	  of	  the	  five	  known	  senses.	  	   (C4)	  Hence,	  we	  perceive	  seeing	  by	  an	  extra	  sense.	  Brentano’s	  Extra-­‐Sense	  Argument	  relied	  on	  an	  Aristotelian	  principle	  for	  the	  individuation	  of	  senses	  (See	  Sorabji	  1971:	  60ff).	  A	  sense	  is	  a	  power	  of	  perception	  (Empfindungsvermögen)	  (1867:	  82).	  Different	  powers	  of	  perception	  are	  exercised	  in	  different	  acts	  of	  perception	  and	  acts	  of	  perception	  are	  distinguished	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  objects,	  namely	  properties	  of	  perceptible	  objects.	  Sight	  is	  the	  power	  to	  perceive	  colours,	  taste	  the	  power	  to	  perceive	  flavours,	  hearing	  the	  power	  to	  perceive	  sounds	  etc.	  The	  well-­‐known	  problem	  with	  this	  proposal	  is	  that	  we	  can	  see	  a	  shape	  as	  well	  as	  feel	  it.	  In	  order	  to	  distinguish	  senses	  in	  line	  with	  our	  intuitive	  way	  of	  counting	  senses	  we	  need	  at	  least	  to	  invoke	  how	  the	  object	  perceived	  is	  given	  to	  us:	  sight	  is	  the	  power	  to	  perceive	  shapes	  together	  with	  colours	  by	  the	  way	  they	  look,	  touch	  is	  the	  power	  to	  perceive	  shapes	  by	  the	  way	  they	  feel	  when	  touched	  etc.	  If	  we	  accept	  the	  Aristotelian	  criterion	  for	  counting	  and	  individuating	  senses,	  the	  inner	  sense	  have	  a	  distinctive	  object.	  What	  is	  it?	  Sensation,	  answered	  Brentano.	  The	  sense	  under	  consideration	  is	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation	  (Sinn	  der	  
Sensation).	  He	  wrote	  about	  this	  sense:	  
Just	  as	  the	  colours	  are	  the	  distinctive	  object	  of	  sight,	  its	  distinctive	  object	  are	  solely	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sensations.	  But	  by	  perceiving	  that	  we	  see	  the	  white	  and	  taste	  the	  sweet,	  and	  distinguish	  these	  sensations,	  it	  makes	  simultaneously	  the	  analogous	  difference	  between	  the	  white	  and	  the	  sweet	  known	  to	  us	  [kennen	  lernen].	  (Brentano	  1867:	  93)	  What	  are	  sensations	  (Empfindungen)?	  ‘Sensation’	  seems	  here	  to	  be	  nothing	  but	  a	  catch-­‐all	  for	  perceptions	  of	  different	  senses.	  According	  to	  the	  last	  quote,	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation	  is	  the	  sense	  by	  means	  of	  which	  we	  perceive	  that	  we	  see,	  taste	  etc,	  that	  is,	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation	  provides	  us	  with	  propositional	  knowledge.	  If	  this	  were	  correct,	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  this	  sense	  could	  also	  make	  the	  difference	  between	  white	  and	  sweet	  known	  to	  us.	  For	  in	  order	  to	  know	  the	  difference	  between	  white	  and	  sweet	  I	  must	  actually	  see	  white	  and	  taste	  sweet,	  propositional	  knowledge	  about	  seeing	  and	  tasting	  is	  insufficient.	  This	  speaks	  in	  favour	  of	  strengthening	  passages	  in	  which	  Brentano	  speaks	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  sensations	  as	  a	  sense	  by	  means	  of	  which	  we	  perceive	  sensations	  (See,	  for	  instance,	  Brentano	  1867:	  95).	  How	  does	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation	  make	  not	  only	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  perceptions	  of	  white	  and	  sweet,	  but	  also	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  
properties	  white	  and	  sweet	  known	  to	  us?	  Brentano	  held	  that	  the	  perceptions	  of,	  for	  instance,	  colours	  stand	  in	  relations	  to	  each	  other	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  relations	  that	  obtain	  between	  the	  colours	  perceived.	  Because	  of	  these	  analogies	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  perceptions	  of	  white	  and	  sweet	  is	  also	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  white	  and	  the	  sweet	  (Brentano	  1867:	  93).	  This	  has	  some	  independent	  plausibility.	  Consider	  experiential	  recall.	  If	  I	  can	  episodically	  recall	  
seeing	  red	  and	  seeing	  blue,	  I	  can,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  also	  recall	  how	  the	  red	  and	  blue	  looked	  to	  me	  and	  can	  distinguish	  between	  them.	  However,	  Brentano	  still	  owes	  us	  an	  informative	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  how	  this	  is	  possible.	  Aristotle	  said	  that	  when	  an	  object	  looks	  green	  to	  one,	  one’s	  seeing	  itself	  is	  ‘in	  way	  coloured’.	  In	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation	  Brentano	  will	  have	  had	  this	  remark	  in	  mind.	  Caston	  (2002:	  790-­‐1)	  spells	  Aristotle’s	  remark	  out	  by	  proposing	  that	  when	  something	  looks	  green	  to	  me,	  my	  seeing	  is	  green	  in	  the	  following	  extended	  sense:	  it	  has	  a	  particular	  what-­‐it-­‐is-­‐likeness	  property	  that	  can	  only	  be	  exhaustively	  described	  by	  mentioning	  green.	  Possessing	  a	  particular	  what-­‐it	  is-­‐likeness	  property	  (phenomenal	  character)	  does	  not	  make	  my	  seeing	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green	  visible	  or	  look	  a	  certain	  way,	  but	  its	  phenomenal	  character	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  other	  perceptions.	  If	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation	  distinguishes	  between	  perceptions	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  phenomenal	  character,	  we	  have	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  story	  how	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation	  can	  make	  us	  aware	  of	  relations	  between	  the	  properties	  perceived.	  If	  I	  am,	  for	  example,	  aware	  of	  seeing	  blue	  and	  seeing	  red,	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  of	  these	  acts	  and	  thereby	  aware	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  red	  and	  blue	  things	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  they	  look.	  This	  idea	  needs	  further	  development	  and,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  know,	  Brentano	  did	  not	  provide	  any.	  However,	  Brentano’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation	  introduced	  an	  important	  philosophical	  theme:	  awareness	  of	  perceiving	  an	  object	  and	  awareness	  of	  the	  object	  perceived	  are	  connected.	  In	  Die	  Psychologie	  des	  
Aristoteles	  awareness	  of	  perceiving	  makes	  distinctions	  between	  objects	  perceived	  known.	  In	  Psychologie	  vom	  empirischen	  Standpunkt	  an	  even	  tighter	  connection	  will	  emerge.	  	  
2.	  The	  Sense	  of	  Sensation	  =	  the	  Common	  Sense	  	  The	  assumption	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  sensation	  seems	  ad	  hoc	  if	  there	  is	  no	  independent	  motivation.	  Brentano	  argued	  that	  we	  have	  independent	  reason	  to	  assume	  that	  there	  is	  a	  common	  sense.	  The	  sense	  of	  sensation,	  as	  it	  turns	  out,	  is	  the	  same	  sense	  as	  the	  common	  sense.	  Since	  we	  have	  independent	  reason	  to	  accept	  a	  common	  sense,	  we	  have	  an	  independent	  reason	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation	  (Brentano	  1867:	  87f.).	  What	  is	  the	  common	  sense?	  The	  common	  sense	  is	  the	  sense	  by	  means	  of	  which	  we	  make	  comparisons	  ‘across’	  different,	  more	  specific	  senses.	  The	  example	  of	  the	  comparison	  between	  the	  white	  and	  the	  sweet	  was	  already	  used	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  Let	  us	  flesh	  it	  out	  a	  bit.	  Imagine	  you	  drink	  a	  White	  Russian	  and	  you	  try	  to	  fully	  appreciate	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  drink.	  You	  can	  perceive	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  white	  colour	  and	  the	  sweetness	  of	  the	  White	  Russian.	  But	  the	  difference	  between	  white	  and	  sweet	  is	  perceived	  neither	  by	  sight	  nor	  by	  taste.	  Aquinas	  used	  observations	  of	  this	  kind	  to	  connect	  inner	  and	  common	  sense:	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[N]either	  sight	  nor	  taste	  can	  discern	  white	  from	  sweet:	  because	  what	  discerns	  between	  two	  things	  must	  know	  both.	  Wherefore	  the	  discerning	  judgment	  must	  be	  assigned	  to	  the	  common	  sense;	  to	  which,	  as	  to	  a	  common	  term,	  all	  apprehensions	  of	  the	  senses	  must	  be	  referred:	  and	  by	  which,	  again,	  all	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  senses	  are	  perceived;	  as	  when	  someone	  sees	  that	  he	  sees.	  (Aquinas	  1265ff,	  78,	  4,	  ad.2)	  The	  inner	  sense	  perceives	  that	  we	  see	  the	  white	  as	  well	  as	  that	  we	  taste	  the	  sweet.	  If	  the	  inner	  sense	  knows	  the	  perceptions	  and	  their	  objects,	  it	  can	  serve	  as	  the	  common	  sense	  by	  means	  of	  which	  one	  can	  compares	  qualities	  across	  sense	  modalities.	  	   Brentano	  (1867:	  87)	  developed	  this	  idea.	  Consider	  his	  sense	  of	  sensation.	  The	  inner	  sense	  has	  simultaneously	  access	  to	  perceivings	  that	  are	  exercises	  of	  different	  senses	  such	  as	  seeing	  a	  colour	  and	  tasting	  a	  flavour.	  It	  can	  distinguish	  between	  them	  and	  thereby	  come	  to	  know	  relations	  between	  their	  objects.	  Hence	  we	  get:	  Sense	  of	  sensations	  =	  the	  power	  to	  perceive	  simultaneously	  perceivings	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  phenomenal	  character	  =	  power	  to	  come	  to	  know	  relations	  between	  the	  qualities	  that	  are	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  perceived	  perceptions	  =	  common	  sense.	  Hence,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  sensation,	  it	  does	  what	  the	  common	  sense	  is	  supposed	  to	  do.	  Therefore	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  common	  sense	  is	  evidence	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation.	  	   Joint	  and	  multidimensional	  perception	  is	  a	  real	  phenomenon.	  But	  does	  it	  require	  a	  new	  sense?	  Why	  can’t	  the	  joint	  perception	  of	  white	  and	  sweet	  be	  the	  simultaneous	  exercise	  of	  sight	  and	  taste?	  If	  the	  senses	  collaborate,	  no	  further	  distinct	  sense	  is	  needed.	  Aristotle	  himself	  seems	  to	  leave	  this	  possibility	  open:	  
Therefore	  discrimination	  between	  white	  and	  sweet	  cannot	  be	  effected	  by	  two	  agencies	  which	  remain	  separate:	  both	  the	  qualities	  discriminated	  must	  be	  present	  to	  something	  that	  is	  one	  and	  single.	  (De	  Anima,	  426b1,	  9-­‐18;	  Hamlyn’s	  translation)	  The	  ‘one	  and	  single’	  thing	  need	  not	  be	  a	  sense.	  Just	  as	  different	  rivers	  may	  supply	  the	  same	  lake,	  different	  senses	  may	  work	  as	  a	  team	  to	  produce	  joint	  consciousness	  of	  their	  respective	  objects.	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Brentano	  argued	  that	  the	  common	  sense	  is	  a	  faculty	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  five	  senses.	  He	  rejects	  the	  ‘sense	  collaboration’	  thesis:	  
[C]an	  we	  perhaps	  perceive	  the	  distinction	  between	  white	  and	  sweet	  by	  means	  of	  simultaneous	  sensations	  of	  two	  different	  senses?	  Certainly	  not.	  This	  is	  as	  little	  possible	  as	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  two	  different	  people	  to	  be	  able	  to	  recognise	  the	  difference	  between	  two	  objects	  if	  each	  of	  them	  senses	  one	  of	  those	  objects.	  (Brentano	  1867:	  87;	  my	  translation)	  Brentano’s	  analogy	  between	  different	  senses	  and	  different	  people	  does	  not	  support	  his	  conclusion.	  Different	  people	  may	  work	  together	  to	  achieve	  a	  common	  aim:	  I	  read	  the	  map,	  you	  steer	  and	  together	  we	  manoeuvre	  the	  car	  to	  the	  right	  destination.	  Why	  should	  different	  senses	  not	  also	  jointly	  contribute	  to	  one	  state	  of	  awareness?	  Brentano	  is	  missing	  a	  premise.	  Tye	  expresses	  the	  missing	  premise	  as	  follows:	  
If	  loudness	  is	  experientially	  ‘trapped’	  in	  one	  sense	  and	  yellowness	  in	  another,	  how	  can	  the	  two	  be	  experienced	  together?	  (Tye	  2007:	  289)	  Talk	  of	  being	  ‘experientially	  trapped’	  is	  suggestive,	  but	  hard	  to	  spell	  out	  in	  a	  satisfactory	  manner.	  	  I	  conclude	  that	  Brentano	  has	  not	  made	  a	  good	  case	  for	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  distinct	  common	  sense	  and,	  in	  turn,	  for	  a	  sense	  of	  sensation.	  This	  speaks	  in	  favour	  of	  his	  later	  view.	  For,	  as	  we	  will	  now	  see,	  he	  will	  go	  on	  and	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation.	  	  
3.	  Brentano	  against	  the	  Inner	  Sense	  View	  	  According	  to	  Brentano,	  Aristotle	  wavered	  on	  the	  question	  whether	  we	  perceive	  perceiving	  by	  means	  of	  a	  further	  sense	  or	  not.	  Sometimes	  Aristotle	  seems	  to	  say	  NO,	  sometimes	  YES.	  In	  his	  Die	  Psychologie	  des	  Aristoteles	  Brentano	  tried	  to	  work	  out	  the	  positive	  answer	  with	  his	  sense	  of	  sensation	  view.	  Seven	  years	  later	  in	  
Psychologie	  vom	  empirischen	  Standpunkt	  Brentano	  retracted	  this	  proposal.	  Looking	  back	  he	  wrote:	  
It	  seems	  that	  [Aristotle’s]	  general	  theory	  of	  mental	  faculties	  can	  be	  more	  easily	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reconciled	  with	  this	  sort	  of	  view	  [that	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  sensation].	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  in	  my	  Psychologie	  des	  Aristoteles	  I	  went	  along	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  commentators	  and	  ascribed	  it	  to	  him.	  However,	  since	  the	  passage	  of	  De	  Anima,	  III,	  2,	  speaks	  so	  clearly	  against	  it,	  and	  since	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  there	  is	  a	  contradiction	  among	  his	  different	  statements	  on	  this	  point,	  I	  adhere	  now	  to	  the	  conception	  presented	  here	  in	  the	  text.	  (Brentano	  1874:	  185-­‐6fn/1995:	  102fn)	  Brentano	  provided	  several	  considerations	  that	  strengthen	  the	  case	  against	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation	  theory	  which	  indirectly	  make	  it	  implausible	  to	  attribute	  it	  to	  Aristotle.	  	  Consider	  hearing	  and	  seeing	  a	  band	  play.	  Here	  the	  scene	  seen	  and	  sounds	  heard	  are,	  as	  one	  might	  intuitively	  put	  it,	  in	  the	  foreground:	  they	  are	  seen	  and	  heard	  together.	  The	  mental	  acts	  are	  not	  primary,	  qualities	  like	  colour	  are;	  we	  perceive	  them	  and	  we	  do	  so	  not	  in	  virtue	  of	  relations	  they	  bear	  to	  our	  perceptions.	  However,	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  Die	  Psychologie	  des	  Aristoteles	  the	  joint	  perception	  of	  qualities	  was	  described	  as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  sensation.	  By	  means	  of	  it	  we	  were	  supposed	  to	  perceive	  simultaneously	  seeing	  and	  hearing.	  We	  would	  thereby	  also	  apprehend	  relations	  between	  the	  perceived	  qualities.	  Now	  Brentano	  thinks	  that	  his	  former	  common	  sense/sense	  of	  sensation	  view	  singled	  out	  the	  wrong	  objects	  as	  primary.	  In	  joint	  perception	  sounds	  etc.	  are	  perceived,	  not	  our	  perceptions	  of	  them.	  	  In	  Psychologie	  Brentano	  gave	  pride	  of	  place	  to	  Aristotelian	  arguments	  that	  speak	  against	  the	  inner	  sense	  theory.1	  He	  referred	  his	  readers	  to	  Aristotle’s	  De	  
Anima	  book	  3.2	  where	  Aristotle	  seems	  to	  reject	  the	  assumption	  of	  an	  inner	  sense:	  
Since	  we	  perceive	  that	  we	  see	  and	  hear,	  it	  must	  either	  be	  by	  sight	  that	  one	  perceives	  that	  one	  sees	  or	  by	  another	  [sense].	  But	  in	  that	  case	  there	  will	  be	  the	  same	  [sense]	  for	  sight	  and	  the	  colour	  which	  is	  the	  subject	  for	  sight.	  So	  either	  there	  will	  be	  two	  [senses]	  for	  the	  same	  thing	  or	  [the	  sense]	  will	  be	  the	  one	  for	  itself.	  	  
Again	  if	  the	  sense	  concerned	  with	  sight	  were	  indeed	  different	  from	  sight,	  either	  there	  will	  be	  an	  infinite	  regress	  or	  there	  will	  be	  some	  [sense]	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  itself,	  so	  that	  we	  had	  best	  admit	  this	  of	  the	  first	  in	  the	  series.	  (425b12—17;	  Hamlyn’s	  translation)	  Aristotle	  suggested	  here	  two	  arguments	  against	  the	  inner	  sense	  theory:	  the	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infinite	  regress	  argument	  and	  the	  duplication	  argument.	  	  David	  Woodruff	  Smith	  and	  others	  take	  Brentano	  to	  use	  the	  infinite	  regress	  argument	  to	  argue	  for	  his	  view:	  
Reviving	  an	  ancient	  argument,	  Brentano	  reasoned	  that	  the	  secondary	  presentation	  cannot	  be	  a	  second	  presentation,	  a	  reflection	  or	  judgement	  upon	  the	  primary	  presentation.	  For	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  an	  infinite	  regress	  […].	  (Smith	  1986:	  149)	  A	  presentation	  P1	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  conscious	  if	  and	  only	  if	  there	  is	  a	  ‘secondary	  presentation’	  P2:	  a	  presentation	  directed	  upon	  P1.	  If	  the	  secondary	  presentation	  is	  a	  ‘second’,	  distinct	  presentation,	  a	  vicious	  infinite	  regress	  threatens.	  No	  such	  regress	  threatens	  if	  P1	  presents,	  among	  other	  things,	  itself.	  	   I	  am	  doubtful,	  however,	  whether	  this	  is	  Brentano’s	  argument.	  He	  expected	  his	  reader	  to	  be	  initially	  inclined	  to	  take	  any	  mental	  act	  to	  be	  conscious:	  
Only	  when	  one	  calculates	  for	  him	  that	  there	  must	  a	  threefold	  consciousness,	  like	  three	  boxes,	  one	  inside	  the	  other	  (dreifach	  ineinandergeschachteltes),	  and	  that	  besides	  the	  first	  idea	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  idea	  he	  must	  also	  have	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  idea,	  will	  he	  become	  wavering.	  (Brentano	  1874:	  182/1995a:	  99-­‐100;	  my	  translation)	  The	  regress	  threat	  is	  an	  obstacle	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  removed	  to	  clear	  the	  way	  for	  accepting	  the	  view	  that	  every	  mental	  act	  is	  conscious;	  but	  it	  is	  not	  used	  by	  Brentano	  in	  an	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  his	  positive	  view.	  	  	   Brentano’s	  argument,	  I	  submit,	  for	  his	  new	  view	  is	  a	  development	  of	  Aristotle’s	  duplication	  argument	  (Brentano	  1874:	  176-­‐9/1995a:	  97-­‐8).	  Anton	  Marty,	  a	  devoted	  follower,	  expounded	  Brentano’s	  argument	  in	  an	  accessible	  way:	  
We	  hear	  some	  note,	  we	  have	  therefore	  a	  presentation	  of	  a	  note	  and	  are	  conscious	  of	  this	  presentation.	  How	  are	  these	  two	  presentations	  related	  to	  each	  other?	  Are	  these	  two	  different	  mental	  acts?	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  one	  would	  have	  to	  present	  the	  note	  twice.	  For	  it	  belongs	  indirectly	  to	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  note.	  But	  inner	  experience	  shows	  without	  doubt	  that	  we	  present	  the	  tone	  only	  once.	  From	  this	  follows	  that	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  tone	  and	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  tone	  are	  not	  two,	  but	  one	  act.	  The	  first	  presentation	  coalesces	  in	  the	  second	  and	  is	  so	  intimately	  connected	  with	  it	  that	  it	  contributes	  to	  its	  being.	  Only	  one	  mental	  phenomenon,	  only	  one	  act	  of	  presenting	  is	  there,	  but	  in	  virtue	  of	  one	  [act]	  two	  things	  come	  about.	  (Marty	  1888/9ff:	  28;	  my	  translation)	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In	  schematic	  form	  the	  argument	  is	  this:	  	   Brentano’s	  Duplication	  Argument	  (P1)	  Assume	  for	  reductio	  that	  S’s	  perceiving	  S	  perceiving	  x	  is	  distinct	  from	  
S’s	  perceiving	  x.	  (P2)	  S’s	  perceiving	  S	  perceiving	  x	  is	  directly	  of	  S’s	  perceiving	  x	  as	  well	  as	  indirectly	  of	  x.	  (C1)	  Hence,	  when	  S	  perceives	  S’s	  perceiving	  x,	  x	  is	  presented	  twice:	  once	  in	  S’s	  perceiving	  S	  perceiving	  x,	  and	  a	  second	  time	  in	  S’s	  perceiving	  x.	  (P3)	  There	  is	  no	  double	  presentation	  of	  x	  when	  S	  perceives	  S’s	  perceiving	  x.	  (C2)	  Hence,	  S’s	  perceiving	  S	  perceiving	  x	  is	  the	  same	  act	  S’s	  perceiving	  x.	  (P1)	  is	  set	  up	  for	  refutation.	  Brentano,	  like	  Aristotle	  before	  him,	  took	  (P3)	  to	  be	  phenomenologically	  plausible.	  When	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  perceiving	  an	  object,	  the	  object	  is	  not	  given	  to	  us	  ‘twice’.	  The	  crucial	  premise	  of	  Brentano’s	  argument	  is	  (P2).	  Is	  it	  better	  justified	  and	  more	  plausible	  than	  (P1)?	  Brentano	  thought	  so:	  when	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  hearing	  a	  tone,	  it	  
seems	  evident	  (einleuchtend)	  that	  the	  tone	  is	  not	  only	  contained	  as	  presented	  in	  the	  hearing	  but	  also	  contained	  in	  the	  simultaneous	  presentation	  of	  the	  hearing.	  (Brentano	  1874:	  171/1995a:	  94;	  my	  translation)	  In	  Psychologie	  Brentano	  left	  it	  at	  that.	  But	  (P2)	  is	  in	  need	  of	  further	  argument	  and	  clarification.	  For	  Brentano’s	  opponents	  hold	  that	  awareness	  provides	  us	  only	  with	  access	  to	  mental	  acts	  and	  not	  also	  with	  access	  to	  their	  objects.	  Further	  argument	  is	  needed.	  	  	   How	  can	  S’s	  perceiving	  S	  perceiving	  x	  be	  the	  same	  act	  as	  S’s	  perceiving	  x?	  When	  we,	  for	  example,	  distinguish	  between	  S’s	  awareness	  of	  hearing	  the	  note	  F	  and	  S’s	  hearing	  F,	  we	  make	  a	  conceptual	  distinction:	  
The	  presentation	  of	  the	  tone	  and	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  tone	  form	  one	  single	  mental	  phenomenon,	  it	  is	  only	  by	  considering	  it	  in	  its	  relation	  to	  two	  different	  objects,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  a	  physical	  phenomenon	  and	  the	  other	  a	  mental	  phenomenon,	  that	  we	  divide	  it	  conceptually	  into	  two	  presentations.	  (Brentano	  1874:	  179/1995a:	  97-­‐8;	  my	  translation)	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Let	  us	  work	  through	  Brentano’s	  example	  of	  hearing	  a	  tone	  to	  get	  a	  grip	  on	  his	  positive	  view.	  ‘Hearing	  tone	  F’	  and	  ‘awareness	  of	  hearing	  tone	  F’	  express	  different	  concepts	  of	  the	  same	  act.	  The	  act	  has	  two	  objects,	  the	  tone	  and	  itself.	  2	  Each	  concept	  conceptualises	  the	  act	  with	  respect	  to	  one	  these	  objects:	  namely	  as	  awareness	  of	  the	  note	  (hearing)	  and	  as	  awareness	  of	  itself	  (awareness	  of	  hearing).	  The	  concepts	  are	  not	  concepts	  of	  two	  distinct	  acts	  that	  are	  parts	  of	  one	  complex	  act.	  For	  otherwise	  the	  note	  F	  were	  presented	  twice:	  once	  in	  the	  subact	  hearing	  tone	  F	  and	  then	  again	  in	  the	  subact	  awareness	  of	  hearing	  tone	  F.	  If	  the	  act	  is	  atomic,	  how	  can	  it	  answer	  to	  different	  concepts?	  Compare	  the	  geometrical	  point	  a:	  it	  has	  no	  spatial	  parts,	  yet	  it	  may	  be	  the	  left	  neighbour	  of	  
point	  b	  and	  the	  right	  neighbour	  of	  point	  c.	  In	  a	  similar	  way	  conscious	  hearing	  of	  F	  is	  atomic,	  yet	  related	  to	  different	  objects	  and	  therefore	  it	  can	  be	  conceptualised	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  How	  can	  an	  atomic	  act	  have	  more	  than	  one	  object?	  Compare	  the	  plural	  demonstrative	  ‘These’.	  It	  is	  syntactically	  simple,	  yet	  in	  the	  right	  context	  of	  utterance	  it	  refers	  to	  some	  things	  and	  not	  just	  one.	  If	  plural	  reference	  without	  syntactic	  complexity	  is	  possible,	  why	  not	  plural	  intentionality	  without	  mental	  complexity?	  	  In	  conclusion,	  Brentano	  arrived	  at	  a	  distinctive	  version	  what	  is	  now	  termed	  the	  ‘same-­‐order	  view’	  of	  consciousness.	  Levine	  (2006,	  190)	  distinguishes	  within	  same-­‐order	  views	  between	  two	  and	  one	  vehicle	  views.	  According	  to	  the	  first	  kind	  of	  view,	  conscious	  mental	  acts	  are	  complex	  and	  have	  a	  part	  that	  presents	  the	  complex;	  according	  to	  the	  second	  kind	  of	  view	  one	  act	  has	  two	  propositional	  contents,	  one	  of	  them	  directed	  on	  the	  mental	  act.	  For	  the	  reasons	  given	  above	  Brentano’s	  same-­‐order	  view	  is	  neither	  a	  two	  nor	  a	  one	  vehicle	  view.	  Brentano	  took	  his	  conclusion	  also	  to	  show	  that	  no	  vicious	  infinite	  regress	  ensues	  if	  all	  mental	  acts	  are	  conscious.	  (See	  Brentano	  1874:	  182/1995a:	  99–100).	  If	  perceiving	  x	  is	  the	  same	  act	  as	  awareness	  of	  perceiving	  x,	  no	  distinct	  further	  mental	  act	  is	  required	  to	  make	  perceiving	  x	  conscious.	  However,	  in	  the	  German	  speaking	  literature	  on	  consciousness	  it	  is	  a	  standard	  complaint	  that	  Brentano’s	  view	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  ‘revenge	  regress’	  because	  the	  awareness	  of	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perceiving	  must	  present	  itself	  as	  a	  presentation	  of	  itself.3	  Whether	  Brentano	  must	  accept	  this	  characterization	  of	  awareness	  is	  controversial.	  	  
4.	  Is	  all	  consciousness	  conscious?	  	  Brentano’s	  conceptual	  division	  view	  was	  intended	  by	  him	  as	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  mind	  (Brentano	  1874:	  198-­‐9/1995a:	  109).	  We	  want	  our	  metaphysics	  of	  mind	  to	  be	  in	  harmony	  with	  what	  awareness	  reveals	  to	  us	  about	  the	  mind.	  Brentano’s	  view	  is	  progress	  in	  this	  respect.	  If	  awareness	  of	  hearing	  and	  hearing	  are	  only	  conceptually	  different,	  then	  one	  cannot	  be	  aware	  of	  hearing	  without	  hearing	  actually	  going	  on.	  But	  what	  about	  the	  other	  direction?	  Is	  every	  mental	  act	  conscious	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  it	  being	  an	  object	  of	  a	  mental	  act,	  namely	  itself?	  Brentano’s	  answer	  was	  a	  clear	  YES.4	  He	  wrote,	  for	  instance,	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Stumpf	  (8.5.1871):	  
No	  presentation	  (Vorstellung)	  without	  knowledge	  of	  the	  presentation	  […]	  and	  no	  thinking	  without	  any	  emotion.	  Yesterday	  I	  found	  this	  acknowledged	  most	  determinately	  by	  a	  number	  of	  writers,	  among	  them	  Hamilton	  and	  Lotze.	  The	  feeling	  belongs	  to	  the	  act	  as	  a	  most	  intimate	  accessory	  (aczessorium)	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  cognition	  (Erkenntnis).	  (Brentano	  1989:	  49;	  my	  translation)	  In	  Psychologie	  Brentano	  argued	  that	  every	  mental	  phenomenon	  presents	  itself,	  acknowledges	  itself	  and	  emotionally	  evaluates	  itself.	  Later	  he	  came	  to	  abandon	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  mental	  phenomena	  involve	  an	  emotion	  toward	  themselves	  (Brentano	  1911a).	  	  	   How	  does	  one	  decide	  the	  question	  whether	  all	  mental	  acts	  are	  conscious	  or	  not?	  Brentano	  took	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  to	  lie	  with	  philosophers	  who	  hold	  that	  there	  are	  unconscious	  mental	  acts.	  Why	  should	  one	  accept	  this	  view?	  Because,	  some	  argued,	  the	  assumption	  that	  all	  mental	  acts	  are	  conscious	  leads	  to	  a	  vicious	  infinite	  regress.	  We	  have	  seen	  in	  section	  3	  how	  Brentano	  proposed	  to	  disarm	  this	  objection.	  In	  Psychologie	  Brentano	  responded	  also	  to	  arguments	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  assumption	  of	  unconscious	  mental	  acts	  pulls	  its	  weight	  in	  psychological	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explanation	  and	  is	  therefore	  empirically	  plausible.	  (See	  Brentano	  1874,	  II,	  chap.	  2,	  §	  4-­‐6.)	  These	  arguments	  often	  have	  the	  following	  form:	  The	  best	  explanation	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  or	  the	  properties	  of	  a	  mental	  phenomenon	  posits	  an	  unconscious	  mental	  phenomenon.	  Hence,	  there	  are	  unconscious	  mental	  acts.	  In	  response	  Brentano	  argued	  that	  the	  explanation	  proposed	  is	  not	  the	  best	  one.	  There	  are	  equally	  good	  explanations	  that	  don’t	  posit	  unconscious	  perceptions.	  According	  to	  Brentano,	  a	  number	  of	  additional	  and	  unwarranted	  assumptions	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  there	  are	  unconscious	  mental	  acts.	  For	  example,	  if	  one	  takes	  (a)	  consciousness	  to	  consist	  in	  judgement	  and	  (b)	  judgement	  to	  consist	  in	  predication,	  one	  will	  reject	  the	  view	  that	  every	  mental	  act	  is	  conscious.	  How	  could	  the	  sensations	  and	  pains	  of	  a	  baby	  on	  this	  view	  be	  conscious?	  Brentano’s	  response	  is	  to	  reject	  (b)	  on	  independent	  grounds	  (see	  CHAP.	  10)	  and	  keep	  (a)	  (Brentano	  1874:	  200/1995a:	  141).	  Likewise,	  if	  one	  takes	  consciousness	  to	  require	  attention,	  one	  will	  also	  find	  the	  thesis	  that	  every	  mental	  act	  is	  conscious	  hard	  to	  believe.	  Brentano’s	  response	  is	  to	  disentangle	  consciousness	  and	  attention:5	  
If	  one	  takes	  into	  account	  that	  being	  co-­‐given	  in	  consciousness	  [mit	  ins	  Bewusstsein	  fallen]	  is	  different	  from	  being	  specifically	  noticed,	  and	  from	  being	  comprehended	  with	  clarity	  which	  allows	  a	  correct	  determination	  and	  description,	  then	  the	  illusion	  that	  some	  psychical	  activity	  can	  be	  devoid	  of	  the	  secondary	  psychical	  relation	  disappears	  completely	  and	  with	  ease.	  (Brentano	  1982:	  23/2002:	  25-­‐6.	  I	  have	  changed	  the	  translation.)	  	  
5.	  Husserl	  against	  Brentano:	  the	  objectification	  objection	  	  	  Brentano	  held	  that	  every	  mental	  act	  is	  consciousness	  of	  something	  and	  of	  itself.	  
Prima	  facie,	  it	  presents	  itself	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  it	  presents	  an	  object	  distinct	  from	  itself.	  Husserl,	  the	  founder	  of	  phenomenology,	  argued	  that	  Brentano	  was	  wrong	  about	  this.	  	  When	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  a	  note,	  it	  is	  given	  to	  me	  as	  an	  object;	  when	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  my	  hearing	  the	  note,	  it	  is	  not	  given	  to	  me	  as	  an	  object	  (see	  Zahavi	  2004	  §iv).	  Let	  us	  first	  explain	  and	  motivate	  the	  objection	  and	  then	  see	  whether	  it	  meets	  its	  target.	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For	  Brentano,	  mental	  acts	  are	  directed	  towards	  objects.	  Husserl	  used	  the	  picture	  of	  directing	  something	  to	  a	  goal	  to	  bring	  out	  what	  in	  his	  view	  Brentano	  had	  missed.	  Mental	  acts	  are	  not	  only	  directed	  on	  objects,	  they	  aim	  for	  something	  and	  they	  can	  be	  fulfilled	  (Husserl	  1913a:	  379).	  For	  example,	  we	  desire	  food	  and	  the	  desire	  is	  satisfied	  when	  we	  have	  eaten	  and	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  this	  fact.	  Object	  perception	  is	  a	  further	  example.	  When	  I	  perceive	  the	  house	  in	  perceiving	  its	  front,	  I	  am	  aware	  that	  further	  perceptions	  of	  it	  are	  available:	  I	  can	  see	  the	  house	  
better,	  I	  can	  see	  more	  of	  it.	  In	  order	  to	  see	  the	  house	  better	  I	  must	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  tracking	  it	  through	  different	  perceptions	  in	  which	  it	  may	  appear	  differently.	  For	  Husserl	  we	  experience	  identity	  of	  object	  through	  changes	  of	  appearance:	  
We	  experience	  ‘consciousness	  of	  identity’,	  that	  is,	  the	  presumption	  that	  one	  apprehends	  identity.	  (Husserl	  1913a:	  382;	  my	  translation)	  It	  seems	  to	  us	  that	  we	  perceive	  one	  and	  the	  same	  object	  through	  changes	  of	  appearances	  because	  in	  perceiving	  an	  object	  we	  have	  expectations	  (in	  a	  broad	  sense)	  about	  how	  it	  will	  appear	  differently	  when	  we	  perceive	  it	  from	  different	  standpoints	  and	  in	  different	  conditions.	  Husserl	  explains	  ‘appearing	  as	  an	  object’	  with	  respect	  to	  object	  perception:	  
The	  sensations	  and	  similarly	  the	  acts	  that	  “apprehend”	  or	  “apperceive”	  them	  are	  here	  
experienced,	  but	  they	  appear	  not	  as	  objects	  (erscheinen	  nicht	  gegenständlich);	  they	  are	  not	  seen,	  heard,	  or	  perceived	  by	  means	  of	  any	  “sense”.	  In	  contrasts,	  objects	  appear,	  are	  perceived,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  experienced.	  Obviously	  we	  exclude	  here	  the	  case	  of	  adequate	  perception.	  (Husserl	  1913a:	  385;	  my	  translation)	  Something	  appears	  to	  us	  as	  an	  object,	  argued	  Husserl,	  if	  and	  only	  if	  we	  experience	  it	  as	  the	  same	  in	  changing	  appearances	  and	  expect	  such	  changes	  when	  perceiving	  it.	  This	  makes	  good	  intuitive	  sense	  if	  we	  take	  an	  object	  to	  be	  a	  mind-­‐independent	  particular.	  According	  to	  Husserl,	  perception	  is	  not	  only	  of	  such	  particulars,	  but	  in	  perception	  they	  seem	  to	  us	  also	  to	  be	  mind-­‐independent	  particulars.	  For	  example,	  it	  seems	  to	  us	  that	  there	  is	  more	  to	  such	  objects	  than	  their	  current	  appearance.	  Husserl	  held	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  the	  appearances	  themselves	  and	  the	  mental	  acts	  that	  ‘interpret’	  them.	  There	  are	  no	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changing	  appearances	  through	  which	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  same	  expectation,	  judgement,	  sensation	  or	  feeling.	  	  	   Husserl	  hit	  on	  an	  important	  distinction	  between	  those	  perceptions	  in	  which	  something	  is	  given	  to	  us	  as	  an	  object	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  awareness	  in	  which	  we	  are	  directed	  upon	  something	  without	  it	  being	  given	  to	  us	  as	  an	  object.	  He	  argued	  further	  that	  mental	  acts	  as	  well	  as	  physical	  objects	  can	  be	  given	  to	  us	  as	  objects	  when	  we	  reflect	  on	  them	  (1913b:	  240-­‐2).	  But	  crucially,	  only	  mental	  acts	  can	  be	  experienced,	  that	  is,	  not	  presented	  to	  us	  as	  objects.	  We	  experience	  mental	  acts	  when	  we	  are	  conscious	  of	  them	  and	  then	  they	  are	  not	  given	  as	  
objects.	  Whether	  Husserl’s	  criticism	  is	  plausible	  depends	  on	  the	  plausibility	  of	  his	  assumptions.	  For	  instance,	  are	  there	  non-­‐intentional	  sensations	  as	  Husserl	  claimed?	  Clearly,	  Brentano	  didn’t	  think	  so	  (CHAP.	  4).	  Whether	  Husserl’s	  criticism	  hits	  its	  target	  depends	  on	  whether	  his	  understanding	  of	  Brentano’s	  talk	  of	  consciousness	  as	  perceptual	  awareness	  of	  objects	  is	  right.	  Husserl	  takes	  Brentano	  to	  commit	  himself	  to	  the	  view	  that	  we	  are	  not	  only	  aware	  of	  a	  hearing,	  but	  also	  aware	  of	  it	  as	  an	  object	  in	  the	  sense	  explained	  above.	  However,	  Brentano	  seemed	  to	  appreciate	  the	  difference	  between	  perception	  in	  which	  something	  appears	  as	  an	  object	  and	  awareness	  that	  is	  not	  ‘objectifying’,	  although	  he	  framed	  it	  in	  a	  different	  terminology.	  In	  Psychologie	  he	  wrote:	  
It	  is	  a	  peculiar	  feature	  of	  inner	  perception	  that	  it	  can	  never	  become	  inner	  observation.	  Objects	  which	  one,	  as	  one	  puts	  it,	  perceives	  outwardly	  can	  be	  observed;	  one	  focuses	  one’s	  attention	  completely	  on	  them	  in	  order	  to	  apprehend	  them	  accurately	  (genau).	  But	  
with	  objects	  of	  inner	  perception	  this	  is	  absolutely	  impossible.	  […]	  It	  is	  only	  while	  our	  attention	  is	  turned	  toward	  a	  different	  object	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  perceive,	  incidentally,	  the	  mental	  processes	  which	  are	  directed	  toward	  that	  object.	  (Brentano	  1874:	  41/1995a:	  22;	  my	  translation	  and	  emphasis)	  If	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  a	  mental	  act,	  we	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  it	  as	  an	  object	  (in	  Husserl’s	  sense).	  For	  instance,	  hearing	  and	  tone	  are	  given	  together,	  but	  only	  the	  tone	  can	  be	  observed,	  it	  ‘appears	  as	  an	  object’	  that	  we	  can	  explore	  further	  and	  seems	  to	  us	  to	  be	  the	  same	  in	  different	  appearances.	  Brentano	  did	  not	  articulate	  this	  distinction	  fully,	  but	  nothing	  he	  said	  seems	  to	  me	  incompatible	  with	  Husserl’s	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claim	  that	  in	  awareness	  mental	  acts	  do	  not	  appear	  as	  objects	  when	  we	  don’t	  reflect	  on	  them.	  Brentano’s	  theory	  of	  consciousness	  may	  be	  incomplete,	  but	  nothing	  stands	  in	  the	  way	  of	  completing	  it.6	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